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Abstract 
Purpose of Study: An experiment was conducted to investigate whether an attentional bias explains why decision makers 
sometimes fail to integrate outcomes of concurrent decisions. Method: Forty-eight undergraduates recruited as participants were 
asked to make fictitious choices of stores located at different distances where they could purchase the same consumer products at 
different prices. In one condition the participants were asked to also make a choice between driving and walking to the stores, in 
another condition to choose between the stores when they had no other option than to walk or drive. Attitudes toward driving 
were independently assessed by means of a questionnaire. Findings and Results: A finding supporting the attentional bias was 
that participants with a more positive attitude toward driving chose more frequently to drive to stores within walking distance 
than participants with a less positive attitude towards driving. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
People frequently face decision tasks requiring that two or more decisions are made concurrently 
(Brehmer, 1992; Huber, 1990). Concurrent decisions are completely dependent if the decision maker 
evaluates and chooses among all combinations of the outcomes of each option entailed by each 
decision. Garling et al. (1997) argued that a more plausible assumption is that such decisions are 
frequently independent or only partially dependent. 
In its simplest case integration refers to adding the utilities of the expected outcomes of one of two 
decisions to the utilities of the expected outcomes of the other decision. According to the principle of 
utility maximization, the outcomes of the two concurrent decisions are integrated when the utilities of 
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the outcomes of an option available in the first decision increases the utilities of the outcomes of an 
option available in the second decision. If this is not the case, the outcomes of the two decisions are 
not integrated. Consider the following demonstration by Tversky and Kahneman (1981, p. 454) 
violating utility maximization:  
Imagine that you face the following pair of concurrent decisions. First examine both decisions, then 
indicate the options you prefer. 
Decision (i). Choose between: 
A. a sure gain of $240 
B. 25% chance to gain $1,000, and 75% chance to gain nothing  
 
Decision (ii). Choose between: 
C. a sure loss of $750 
D. 75% chance to lose $1,000, and 25% chance to lose nothing 
 
     A majority of participants chose options A and D. However, in choosing between the following 
two alternatives, they chose B' which maximizes expected utility: 
A'. 25% chance to gain $240, and 75% chance to lose $760  
B'. 25% chance to gain $240, and 75% chance to lose $750 
     Since alternative B' is B and C combined whereas A' is A and D combined, the two decisions did 
not maximize expected value. Why did the concurrent decisions fail to maximize expected utility? It 
should first be noted that if the decisions are made independently, consistent with prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Fox, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) each decision 
maximizes value. Because the value function is concave for gains and convex for losses, the value 
associated with a sure gain of $240 is greater than 24% of the value associated with a gain of 
$1,000. At the same time, the value associated with a loss of $750 is smaller than 75% of the 
value associated with a loss of $1,000. In addition, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) suggested that 
each decision is framed in a "minimal account," that is, as being made independently of the other 
decision. Such a decision frame may frequently be employed because it "..(i) simplifies evaluations 
and reduces cognitive strain, (ii) reflects the intuition that consequences should be causally linked to 
acts, and (iii) matches the properties of hedonic experience which is more sensitive to desirable and 
undesirable changes than to steady states" (p. 457).Boe and Garling (1998a, 1998b) investigated 
several of the possible factors that according to Tversky and Kahneman (1981) counteract 
integration. One factor is that the number of options and outcomes of each decision imposes 
cognitive strain. In line with this assumption it was demonstrated that outcomes are integrated 
when they are riskless but not when they are risky or uncertain.  For instance, a choice of a consumer 
product is a riskless outcome that was integrated with another riskless outcome. In contrast, a choice 
of a lottery ticket with the consumer product as the prize is an uncertain outcome that was not 
integrated with another uncertain outcome. Risky or uncertain outcomes impose cognitive strain 
partly because the number of outcomes increases, partly because of the demand on the decision 
maker to imagine different possibilities. As observed by Tversky and Shafir (1992), people are often 
reluctant to think through the implications of each outcome in the presence of risk or uncertainty.       
Boe and Garling (1998a) also demonstrated that causally related outcomes were integrated whereas 
causally nonrelated outcomes were not. Thus, the added utility of choosing a means to an end 
influenced the choice when the end had been chosen or the reverse. For integration to occur, the 
outcomes of concurrent decisions may need to be causally linked (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In a 
similar vein, Bonini and Rumiati (1996) showed that the likelihood that participants made 
dependent decisions in the jacket and calculator problem increased when it was made salient that the 
outcomes were related. For instance, purchase choices became dependent when embedded in a 
shopping list. 
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     In order to make concurrent decisions that maximize overall utility, a decision maker must attend 
to the additional benefits obtained from the combinations of outcomes. Any factor preventing or 
promoting  this  is  likely  to  affect  the  integration  of  the  outcomes. In the demonstration by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) reported above, it is possible that the outcomes of each choice 
(obtaining a sure gain or avoiding a sure loss) are so attractive that the combinations of outcomes 
are never considered. Thus, it is perhaps not sufficient that the value of the combination is larger 
than the sum of the values of each outcome. For integration to occur, a decision maker has to attend 
to all possible outcomes. If he or she never enumerates and evaluates all the combinations because 
it would impose too much cognitive strain, it is possible that single outcomes are evaluated before 
combined outcomes are evaluated. Furthermore, if one of these outcomes is very attractive, the 
decision maker may never become aware of combinations of outcomes that are even more attractive. 
Even if cognitive strain is absent, it is plausible to assume that participants search and evaluate 
outcomes sequentially (Simon, 1982), perhaps starting with the single outcomes before the 
combined outcomes. Again, if participants encounter highly attractive single outcomes, then they 
may be satisfied with these and refrain from further search. We refer to this phenomenon as an 
attentional bias, assuming that the outcome of the bias is that participants choose single preferred 
outcomes rather than more preferred combined outcomes. In line with this hypothesis, Boe and 
Garling (1998c) demonstrated that attractive combined outcomes were never chosen despite that 
they were riskless and causally related.                                                                                                 
     In the present experiment we further investigate the attentional bias in concurrent decisions. 
Participants were asked to make fictitious choices of stores located at different distances where they 
could purchase the same consumer products at different prices. They were asked to also make a 
choice between driving and walking to the stores. The most attractive store (where the price of the 
consumer product was lowest) was either within walking distance or not. We hypothesize that to a 
larger extent participants who express a positive attitude toward driving will ignore distance when 
they make concurrent decisions than will participants with a less positive attitude. 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
     Forty-eight undergraduates (24 men and 24 women) participated in return for the equivalent of 
USD 7.00. They were recruited from a pool of undergraduates who at the beginning of the semester 
volunteered to participate in experiments. Their mean age was 23.8 years (SD=3.8, range 18 to 36). 
All of them had a driving license. On the basis of a measure of attitude toward driving consisting of 
ratings on three 7-point adjective scales (negative-positive, bad-good, and dull-fun) administered to 
participants, a median split was made. A group of 24 participants with positive attitudes was thus 
formed (M=6.0, SD=l.0) and contrasted to the remaining 24 participants with a less positive attitude 
(M=3.4, SD=0.9). 
2.2. Materials 
     The materials consisted of fictitious choices of where to purchase the same consumer products at 
different prices. Table 1 shows that distance to the stores and price of the products were 
systematically varied so that in half of the choices the consumer products at the low price could be 
purchased in the store at the short distance, in the other half of the choices in the store at the long 
distance. The short distances were within and the longest distances longer than walking distance. 
As  determined  by  asking  another  group  of  participants  to  make  choices  between  walking and driving for 
different distances to the destination (Garling, Boe, & Golledge, 2000). 
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Table 1. The choice problems in which distance to the store and price of the product varied. 
Productᵃ    Store 1    Store 2 
Ring pants                    4800 meters/SEKᵇ 675  2200 meters/SEK 725 
Sunglasses                   4900 meters/SEK 575                   2200 meters/SEK 625 
Jacket Shoes  5000 meters/SEK 775                    2400 meters/SEK 825 
Wallet    5100 meters/SEK 875                    2500 meters/SEK 925 
Sweater   2200 meters/SEK 675                   4800 meters/SEK 725 
Camera   2300 meters/SEK 575                   4900 meters/SEK 625 
2400 meters/SEK 775  5000 meters/SEK 825 
2500 meters/SEK 875  5100 meters/SEK 925 
 
ᵃThe products were randomly assigned to stores and prices in different ways for different participants. 
ᵇA Swedish Crown (SEK) is approximately US$ 0.15. 
2.3. Design 
     The design was mixed factorial with a between-subjects factor attitude towards driving and two 
within-subject factors type of decision problem (concurrent choices of store and travel mode vs. 
single choice of store for different travel modes) and short vs. long distance to the store with the low 
price. 
2.4. Procedure 
     Participants served individually. They were seated in a sound proof room facing a computer 
screen on which all information was presented. After having read general instructions for how to 
perform in the experiment, participants were told that their task was to choose between traveling to 
different stores where they could purchase the same consumer products at different prices. The 
instructions stressed that the consumer products were identical except for price. Participants were 
also asked to imagine that they planned to return directly back from the store. 
     Participant’s encountered one block of trials consisting of concurrent choices of store and travel 
mode (driving or walking), another block consisting of single choices of store. Half of the 
participants received the block with single choices before the block with concurrent choices, the 
other half of the participants in the reverse order. 
     The choice problems were presented at a self-paced rate. When the participants were prepared 
to respond, they pressed return. The choice problem then appeared on the screen. Single choices 
were presented alone on the screen. In the block with single choices, participants were in half 
the cases told that their only option was to walk, in the other half that their only option was to 
drive to the stores. An example is: 
You have decided to buy a ring.  It can be found at different prices in two stores to which you can only 
walk/drive/.  Indicate which store (A or B) you would choose: 
A. Price SEK 675 Distance 4800 meters 
B. Price SEK 725 Distance 2200 meters 
     
When the participants were prepared to respond, they pressed return so that the text disappeared. 
Then they typed an A or B. After that another screen appeared, asking the participants to press 
return when they were prepared for a new choice problem. 
     In the block with concurrent choices,one of the choices appeared on the screen above the other as 
in this example: 
You have decided to buy a ring.  It can be found at different prices in two stores. You can choose to walk 
or  drive  there. Indicate which travel mode you would choose  (A or  B),  and which store (C  or D) you 
would choose. 
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A. Drive 
B. Walk 
C. Price SEK 675 Distance 4800 meters 
D. Price SEK 725 Distance 2200 meters 
 
  After having considered all information, the participants pressed return so that the text 
disappeared. Then they responded to the first choice problem by typing an A or B. After pressing 
return once again, the participants indicated their second choice by typing C or D. The presentation 
sequence was in all other respects the same as in the block of single choices. 
    Participants were presented each concurrent choice problem twice, whereas the single choice 
problems were presented once with walking as the forced choice and a second time with driving as 
the forced choice. Within each block the orders between the choice problems were individually 
randomized. Which choice alternatives that were designated A or B, or C or D, was counterbalanced 
within and across participants. After having performed the experiment, participants were requested 
to fill out a questionnaire measuring their attitude towards driving. 
    A session lasted for approximately 45 minutes. Participants were debriefed and paid after 
having completed the session. 
3. Findings and Results 
The results are given in Table 2 for the groups with positive and negative attitudes toward driving. 
The table shows the percentages of choices of the attractive and non-attractive stores for each travel 
mode in the concurrent decisions as well as the percentages of choices of the attractive stores when 
participants were forced to walk or drive in the single choices. The attractive stores (with the 
cheapest product) were either situated at a short or long distance..  
 
Table 2. Mean percentages of choices of the attractive and non-attractive store in single choices when forced to walk or drive 
and in concurrent decisions for choices of walking or driving related to distance to the store and attitude toward driving. 
                               Distance to attractive store and attitude toward driving 
                       Short      Long 
  
           Positive    Negative                Positive  Negative 
Single choices 
 
Walk to attractive store 97.9 97.9 57.3 80.2 
Drive to attractive store 91.7 90.6 76.0 94.8 
Concurrent choices    
Walk to attractive store 62.5 78.1 29.2 53.6 
Walk to non-attractive store 5.7 8.3 8.8        9.9 
Drive to attractive store 27.6 11.5  59.9 24.0 
Drive to non-attractive store     4.2 2.1 2.1      12.5 
 
     In single choices, when the distance was short the attractive store was almost always 
chosen by both participants with a positive attitude and a negative attitude toward driving. When 
the distance was long, positive attitude participants less frequently chose the attractive store 
than the negative attitude participants. However, when forced to walk both groups chose the 
attractive store less frequently at the long distance. A 2 (group: positive attitude vs. negative 
attitude towards driving) by 2 (forced travel mode: driving vs. walking) by 2 (distance to 
attractive store: short vs. long) mixed factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated 
measures on the last two factors was performed. The analysis revealed a significant main effect 
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of group, F(l, 46) = 6.69, p<. 05, MS.=.50, a significant main effect of distance, F( l, 46) = 18.51, 
p<.001, MS.=l.46 , a significant interaction between group and distance, F(l, 46) = 6.93, p<.05 , 
MS.=.55, and a significant interaction between travel mode and distance, F(l, 46) = 29.13, p<.001,  
MS.=.66.    
     Separate Bonferonni-corrected t-tests at p=. 05 showed that participants with a positive attitude 
significantly less frequently chose the attractive store when the distance was long than when it was 
short. Furthermore, when forced to walk the attractive store was on average chosen significantly less 
frequently at the long distance. 
     In the concurrent choices, when the distance was short and participants  chose  to  drive,  
those  with  a  positive  attitude more frequently chose the attractive store than did participants 
with a negative attitude. The same differences were obtained for the long distance. This pattern was 
reversed for participants who chose to walk. No noticeable differences were observed between the 
attitude groups for the choices of walking or driving to the non-attractive stores. An additional 2 
(group: positive attitude vs. negative attitude towards driving) by 2 (travel mode: driving vs. 
walking) by 2 (distance to attractive store: short vs. long) mixed factorial analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with repeated measures on the last two factors performed on the percentages of choices 
of walking or driving to the non-attractive store did not reveal any significant effects. In contrast, a 
parallel ANOVA on the choices of the attractive store yielded a significant main effect of travel 
mode due to more frequent choices of walking than driving, F( l, 46) = 9.74, p<.01, MSe=3.03, a 
significant interaction  between  group  and travel  mode, F( l, 46)  = 8.19, p<.01, MSe=2.55, and a 
significant interaction between travel mode and distance, F( l, 46) = 23.67, p<.001, MSe=3.16. 
Bonferonni-corrected t tests at p=.05 showed that participants with a positive attitude chose to drive 
significantly more frequently than did participants with a negative attitude whereas the reverse was 
true for choices to walk. Only participants with a negative attitude significantly more frequently 
chose to walk than drive. Choices to walk were significantly more frequent than choices to drive at 
the short distance. Choices of walking were significantly more frequent at a short distance than a 
long distance whereas the reverse was the case for choices to drive. 
4. Conclusions 
     The basic goal of this research was to investigate a phenomenon referred to as an attentional 
bias. If a decision maker tries to maximize overall utility when he or she faces concurrent decisions, 
paying attention to the additional benefits obtained from the combinations of outcomes should be 
expected. As shown by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), this is, however, not always the case. For 
integration to occur, a decision maker must attend to all possible outcomes. It is possible that he or 
she never enumerates and evaluates all combinations of outcomes simply because of the added 
cognitive strain. It is therefore plausible to assume that an evaluation of single outcomes takes place 
before an evaluation of combined outcomes. Besides, strong preferences for single choices can be 
found in many situations. If a decision maker displays such strong preferences for a single option or 
outcome, this preference may detract attention from the fact that certain other combinations are 
more preferable. A decision maker may then never become aware of combinations of outcomes that 
would be even more attractive if one of these outcomes is very attractive. Even when cognitive strain 
is absent, it is thus possible that a decision maker evaluates outcomes in a sequential manner (Simon, 
1982), starting with the single outcomes. 
     In the present experiment it was hypothesized that participants who expressed a positive 
attitude toward driving to a larger extent would ignore distance when making concurrent decisions as 
compared to participants with a less positive attitude. The results showed very clearly that 
distances to the attractive store were more or less ignored by participants with a positive attitude 
toward driving, thus they chose very frequently to drive to the attractive store. When the distance to 
the attractive store was short, choices of driving were, however, less frequent for participants with a 
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positive attitude. On the other hand, participants with a negative attitude also tended to ignore 
distance and chose to walk at the long distances.  
     Yet, independently of whether they were forced to drive or forced to walk, both participants 
with a negative and positive attitude almost always chose the attractive store when it was close but 
the non-attractive (closer) store when they were forced to walk and the attractive store was at the long 
distance. Thus, participants were more sensitive to distance when they did not choose travel mode. 
When forced to walk to the attractive store at the long distance, participants with a positive attitude 
less frequently chose the most attractive store than did negative attitude participants. 
    This suggests that participants with a positive attitude toward driving choose to drive at shorter 
distances (cf. Garling et al., 2000). If so, the interpretation of the results from the concurrent 
decisions needs to be qualified. However, since participants with a positive attitude also less 
frequently at the long distance chose to drive to the less attractive store, there may be a difference in 
how they perceive distance. This is an issue that needs attention in future research. 
   It is possible to interpret the results as if participants failed to follow a utility-maximization 
principle by ignoring distance information. Still, participants did not do this completely. If it is 
assumed that integration is directed by participants' attitudes towards driving, the results showed that 
some integration took place. Thus, in contrast to Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and Boe and Garling 
(1998b), the results indicated that outcomes of concurrent decisions are integrated. In Boe and 
Garling (1998b) it was suggested that outcome uncertainty counteracted integration. In the present 
experiment there was no uncertainty about the outcomes, and the reduced number of options and 
outcomes of each decision probably decreased the cognitive load involved in making a decision. 
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